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INTRODUCTION

Congress in 1990 promulgated the Americans with Disabilities
Act' (hereinafter "ADA" or "Act") to rectify the inferior status of
disabled Americans.2 One of the initial hurdles to such legislation
was defining whom the Act would cover. The text of the Act states
that a person is within the protected class of disabled persons if that
person (A) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities; (B) has a record of such an
impairment; or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment.'
A person claiming to be actually disabled (i.e., who claims to
qualify under the first prong of the definition) must prove that she
(1) has a physical or mental impairment (2) that substantially limits
(3) one or more major life activities.' Each of these limitations may
be defined either broadly or narrowly; the definition of each limitation has a significant influence on whom the Act protects.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Regulations to
the ADA (hereinafter "EEOC Regulations" or "Regulations") define
major life activities as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."' Often, an impairment will limit many such activities. Deafness, for example, in addition to limiting a person's ability
to hear, also makes it difficult to learn to speak, and may make it
difficult to find employment. Many impairments, however, only limit
the major life activity of working. A mild case of epilepsy, causing
infrequent and mild seizures, might not affect a person's nonworking
life at all, but will make it very difficult to find employment.6 The

1.
fied as
2.
3.
4.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codiamended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. H 1992)).
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (Supp. H1 1992).
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. 1I 1992).
Id.

5. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1992).
6. People with any history of epilepsy are ineligible to drive trucks in interstate commerce. 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(8) (1992). Epileptics are ineligible for "hazardous" jobs in the

federal civil service unless they have been seizure-free without medication for two years.
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEIENT, HANDBOOK OF SELECTIVE PLACEMENT OF PERSONS
wITH PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HANDICAPS IN FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT, OPM

Doc. 125-11-3, 63 (1981). Similarly, the military will not consider applications from epileptics
until they have been seizure-free without medication for five years. EPnEPSY FOUNDATION OF
AMRICA, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS wrr- EPILEPsY 7 (1985). Many states refuse to issue a
driver's license to epileptics who have not been seizure-free for a specified amount of time.
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Regulations explicitly state that a person who only is limited in the
major life activity of working is protected by the Act.' This article
examines what it means to be substantially limited in the major life
activity of working.
Not all characteristics which affect one's ability to work are protected by the ADA. Human beings differ from one another in many
ways, not all of which are thought of as disabilities. I, for example,
am a dark-haired, brown-eyed, right-handed male with broad shoulders, small feet, and a passion for hockey, Pushkin, and Nanci Griffith. If an employer rejects my employment application because of
any of these characteristics, I might be displeased, but I will not
consider myself discriminated against on the basis of disability.
These characteristics are likewise unprotected by the ADA. The
text of the ADA limits in two ways the class of persons who can
claim protection because a condition limits their major life activity of
working: they must have (1) a substantially limiting (2) physical or
mental impairment.' The Act does not define either of these limitations; interpretation was left to the EEOC and to the courts.
EEOC Regulations define "impairment" to include physiological
disorders, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, and mental or
psychological disorders.' Mere physical characteristics such as eye
color or left-handedness are not covered; nor are environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages such as poverty or lack of education." This definition thus imposes an effective limitation on the
scope of the Act, and prevents mere "difference" from being protected as "disability."
EEOC Regulations also qualify what it means to be "substantially
limited" in the major life activity of working. A person's inability to
perform a particular job, the Regulations state, does not substantially
limit that person's ability to work." Instead, a person must be unable
to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in order to

Id. The inability to drive to work further limits epileptics' employment opportunities. COMMISSION FOR THE CONTROL OF EPILEPSY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, 1 PLAN FOR NATIONWIDE ACTION ON EPILEPSY 85 (1977). As a result of these exclusionary policies, the unemployment rate among fully
employable epileptics is more than twice the national average. I
7. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2() (1992).

8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (1992).
10. 29 C.F.RL app. § 1630.2(h) (1992).
11. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1992).
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be "substantially limited" in the major life activity of working. 2
This definition of "substantially limited" is consistent (or at least,
is not blatantly inconsistent) with the text and purpose of the Act
insofar as it pertains to persons who are discriminated against because
(A) they are in fact disabled (i.e., persons who have a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more life activities). 3 Recall, however, that the Act also protects (B) persons with a
record of such an impairment, and (C) persons who are regarded as
having such an impairment. 4 The word "such" in the latter two
phrases indicates that the "substantially limited" and "major life activity" qualifications that apply to part (A) of the definition also apply
to parts (B) and (C). Thus, a person who claims protection under part
(C) must show that she is regarded as having an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity.
By applying the EEOC gloss to the statutory requirements, a
person who claims that she is regarded as disabled for the major life
activity of working must prove that she is regarded as having an
impairment that renders her unable to perform either a class of jobs
or a broad range of jobs. 5 Merely showing that one employer regards her as unemployable is not enough. Take, for example, the case
of a telephone company employee who is fired from his job installing
telephones because his asthma and medically-induced heat sensitivity
make it impossible for him to accept temporary transfers to extremely
hot parts of the country. 6 In order to make the threshold showing
that he is regarded as a disabled individual, he must show that his
employer regards him as unable to perform a wide range of jobs.17 It
is not enough that his employer regards him as unable to perform the
job for which he was hired.
This interpretation of the "regarded as" test runs directly contrary
to congressional intent, which was to protect individuals such as this
telephone installer. 8 The House Judiciary Report, for example, states
that a person will be covered under the "regarded as" test "whether

12. Id.
13.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (1992).

14. 42 U.S.C. §12102(2) (Supp. 111 1992).
15. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(g)(3)
16. See Miller v. AT & T
opinion adopted, 915 F.2d 1404
2) (construing an Oregon statute
17. Id. at 639.

(1992).
Network Sys., 722 F. Supp. 633 (D. Or. 1989), affid and
(9th Cir. 1990) (discussed in greater detail infra Part IV-Aidentical, in relevant part, to the ADA).

18. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 30 (1990).
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or not the employer's perception is shared by others in the field."' 9
The EEOC interpretation also defies both logic and the plain text of
the Act: How can one say that this telephone installer's medical condition did not substantially limit his major life activity of working? It
did, after all, cause him to be fired.
This article argues that the EEOC definition of "substantially
limits" is too narrow and excludes a large class of persons Congress
intended to protect. The purpose of the narrow EEOC definition - to
keep "difference" from being protected as "disabled" - is adequately
met by the EEOC definition of impairment. A person should be recognized as substantially limited in the major life activity of working
if that person is excluded from even one job because she has - or is
regarded as having - an impairment. I call this standard the "once is
enough" test.
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the ADA and its
legislative precursor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973' ("Rehabilitation
Act"). Part II examines the concept of "impairment" in the context of
both the EEOC Regulations to the ADA and the case history of the
Rehabilitation Act. It concludes that although "impairment" is and
should be interpreted broadly, it still adequately distinguishes between
"difference" and "disability." Part III discusses the "regarded as"
prong of the test, covering both Congressional intent and EEOC treatment. Part IV examines the "substantial limitation" qualification as it
relates to the major life activity of working. It first describes the
Rehabilitation Act and the EEOC approaches - both of which explicitly reject the "once is enough" test. It next lists and describes the
eight shortcomings of these approaches. The final section of Part IV
describes how these two approaches run afoul of the Congressional
intent behind the ADA.
Part V of this article proposes two new standards for evaluating
when a person is substantially limited in the major life activity of
working. The preferred approach is the "once is enough" test, which
recognizes that a person's employment opportunities are substantially
limited when she is excluded from even one job because she is - or
is regarded as - disabled. An alternative approach shifts to employ-

19. Id. at 30.
20. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2, 87 Stat. 355, 357, reprinted in
1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 409, 410 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §701-794 (1988)). The Rehabilitation Act originally protected "handicapped" individuals; the 1992 Amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act changed the terminology to "disabled" individuals. This was not intended
as a change in substance.
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ers the burden of proving the existence of alternative employment
opportunities. While this latter approach does not solve the problems
inherent in the EEOC and Rehabilitation Act approaches, it does
decrease their significance by limiting the situations in which employers are allowed to avail themselves of the "other jobs are available"
defense.
I. ORIGIN AND OVERViEW OF THE ADA
A. The Rehabilitation Act
Prior to the passage of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act was the
primary source of federal protection for disabled persons. The Rehabilitation Act originally was enacted to provide vocational rehabilitation for disabled persons;2 Section 504 was intended to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals by affording them equal opportunities in federally funded programs.' Originally an "inconspicuous part' of the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504 only became significant several years after its enactment when the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") empowered the Office of
Civil Rights to draft implementing regulations for the Rehabilitation
Act.4
A Section 504 plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of employment discrimination by showing that she was (1) an individual with a
disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) qualified
for the job but for her disability; (3) denied a job, promotion, or raise
for which she applied; and (4) excluded solely because of her disability. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to show either that the plaintiff was not
otherwise qualified, or that any possible accommodation would

See 119 CONG. REC. 24,571 (1973).
22. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6373, 6388.
21.

23.

RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS 1 (1984), cited in Julie

Brandrield, Note, Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 59
FORDHAM L. Rnv. 113, 116 n.25 (1990).
24. Brandfield, supra note 23, at 116. The regulations were not implemented until 1978.
SCOTCH, supra note 23, at 80.
25. See Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1989); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1148 (3d Cir. 1988); Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271,
1280 (8th Cir. 1985); Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 309-10 (5th Cir.
1981).
26. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (holding that
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cause the employer undue hardshipY Finally, the plaintiff has the

opportunity to rebut the employer's contention of undue hardship by
showing that the proposed accommodation is indeed reasonable.'
A major shortcoming of the Rehabilitation Act is its limited
scope.29 Section 501 requires affirmative action in federal employment, Section 504 prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs," and Section 503 requires affirmative action programs by
federal contractors receiving more than $10,000.7 This narrow coverage precludes the effectiveness of the Rehabilitation Act in combating
general societal discrimination against disabled persons. 2
B. The Status of Disabled Americans33
By almost any definition, Americans with disabilities are uniquely
underprivileged and disadvantaged. They are much poorer, much less
educated, and have less of a social life, fewer amenities, and a lower
level of self-satisfaction than other Americans.'

Congressional findings in the ADA indicate recognition that discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists and is perva-

sive throughout all facets of life.35 This discrimination includes outright intentional exclusion; the discriminatory effects of barriers in
architecture, transportation, and communication; overprotective rules
and policies; failure to make modifications to existing facilities and
practices; exclusionary qualifications standards and criteria; segrega-

tion; and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits,

an otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in
spite of his handicap).
27. Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d at 397-98.
28. See id-, see also Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d at 310.
29. For a broad treatment of the limitations of the Rehabilitation Act, see NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT O FEDERAL
LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WrH DiSARIrms -

WrrH LEoISLATIVE REC-

OMMENDATIONS A-6 to A-14 (1986) [hereinafter TOWARD INDEPENDENCE].
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (1990).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 703 (Supp. 1993).
32. See infra Part I-B.
33. See generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis
and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
413, 415-26 (1991); UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATINGTE
SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABIITES 17-45 (1983) [hereinafter ACCOMMODATING THE
SPECTRUM].
34. SENATE SUBCOMMITTE ON ma HANDICAPPED, S. HRO. 166, pt. 2, at 9 (1987)
(statement of Humphrey Taylor).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. I 1992).
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and jobs.'
The status of disabled Americans in employment is documented
by a 1986 nationwide Harris poll.' Two-thirds of working age peo-

ple with disabilities are unemployed, a rate which exceeds all other
demographic groups under age sixty-five." This extraordinary unem-

ployment rate is not a result of the disabled individual's unwillingness
to work,3 9 poor performance,' expensive insurance premiums,4 1 or
the cost of accommodation,42 but instead is due predominantly to
employment discrimination. 3

C. The Response of the Americans with Disabilities Act
To rectify the inferior status of disabled Americans,' Congress in
1990 promulgated the Americans with Disabilities Act. One of the
initial hurdles to such legislation was defining who the Act would
cover.

36. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (Supp. MI 1992).
37. Louis HARRIS & Assocs., TBE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING
DISABLED AMERICANS imNo THm MAINSTREAM (1986), cited in Burgdorf, supra note 33, at
415-16, 420-22.
38. Id.
39. 'Two-thirds of those not working want to work." Id at 421.
40. Individuals with disabilities tend to maintain above average work attendance and
productivity. IL at 420, 421 n.41.
41. Id. at 421.
42. According to a 1982 study measuring the cost of accommodating employees under
the Rehabilitation Act, 51% of accommodations can be provided without cost to the employer, 30% of the accommodations which impose costs can be provided for less than $500, and
only 8% of accommodations cost over $2000. Berkeley Planning Associates, A Study of
Accommodations Provided to Handicapped Employees by Federal Contractors, Volume I:
Study Findings 28-31 (1982), cited in GAO, PERSONS WrrH DisABILIaTIs: REPORTS ON
COSTS OF ACCOMMODATIONS, GAO Briefing Report GAO/H.R. Doc. No. 44 BR, 101st Cong.
19-20 (1990).
43. See Burgdorf, supra note 33, at 421 n.37, citing, inter alia, a report by the
President's Committee on Employment with Disabilities finding that 45 different studies conclude that the discriminatory attitudes of employers are the predominant reason why people
with disabilities do not have jobs. Burgdorf also discusses a Harris survey reporting that
three-fourths of business managers admit that people with disabilities often encounter job
discrimination from employers, and the conclusion of Frank Bowe that employer attitudes
toward workers with disabilities are "less favorable than those . .. toward elderly individuals,
minority group members, ex-convicts, and student radicals:' See LoUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS.,
THE ICD SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS 12 (1987); FRANK BOwE, HANDICAPPING AmERICA: BARRiERS TO DISABLED PEOPLE (1978); William G. Johnson, The Rehabilitation Act and Discrimination Against Handicapped Workers: Does the Cure Fit the Disease?, in DISABILITY AND THE LABOR MARKET 242, 245 (Monroe Berkowitz & M. Anne
Hill eds., 1986).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (Supp. I 1992).
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1. Who is protected
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.'
The first prong of the ADA's tripartite definition of disability includes physiological disorders, cosmetic disfigurement, and mental or
psychological disorders,' and, "is to be determined without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines or assistive or prosthetic devices."47 Mere physical characteristics such as eye color, left-handedness, or height or weight within "normal" range are not covered; nor
are environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages such as poverty, lack of education, or a prison record. 4 Major life activities indude, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working.49 The "impairment" requirement is discussed in more detail
in Part II of this article; the "substantial limitation" requirement,
insofar as it pertains to the major life activity of working, is discussed in Part IV.
The purpose of the second prong of the definition - having a
record of such an impairment - is to ensure that people are not
discriminated against because of a history of disability. 0 For example, former cancer patients may not be discriminated against on the
basis of their prior medical history.5 This provision also protects
persons who have been misclassified as disabled, for example, as
having a learning disability 2
The purpose of the third prong of the definition - regarded as

45.
46.
2, at 51
47.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. HI 1992).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (1992); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
(1990).
29 C.FR. app. § 1630.2(h) (1992); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2,

at 51-52 (1990).
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1992).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1992).
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k) (1992).
Id.
Id
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substantially limited in a major life activity - is to protect an individual discriminated against due to the "myths, fears, and stereotypes"
associated with disabilities 3 The Regulations adopt the finding of
the Supreme Court in the Section 504 case of School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline, in which the Court stated that "society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment."55 The "regarded as" prong of the test is discussed in more
detail in Part II of this article.
2. Scope of coverage
The broad coverage of the ADA far surpasses the limited scope
of the Rehabilitation Act. When fully implemented, the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA will extend to employment,56 public
services,' public transportation,58 public accommodations and commercial facilities, 9 and telecommunication.' The purpose of the employment provisions of the ADA, Title I, is to rectify the inferior
status of disabled Americans and to provide to them a "meaningful
equal employment opportunity";6' i.e., an opportunity to attain the

same level of performance as is available to nondisabled people.62
3. The employer's duty of reasonable accommodation
Title I of the ADA defines discrimination as "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability."' The EEOC
Regulations to the ADA delineate three categories of reasonable accommodation.' First, an employer must modify or adjust the job
53. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1992).
54. 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (holding that a schoolteacher with tuberculosis is a "handicapped person" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act).

55. Id. at 284.
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (Supp. 111 1992).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (Supp. 111 1992).
58.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12165 (Supp. I 1992).

59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Supp. 11 1992).
60. 47 U.S.C. § 225(c) (Supp. 111 1991).
61. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 66.
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. HI 1992).
64. "Reasonable accommodation" has become a term of art in the context of Title VII
religious discrimination. In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Su-

preme Court interpreted the undue hardship limitation of EEOC regulations as not requiring
employers to "reasonably accommodate" workers' religious beliefs if doing so would impose
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application process to allow an otherwise qualified disabled applicant
to be considered for the position.' Second, the employer must modify or adjust the work environment, or the manner in which the job is
customarily performed, to enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position.' Third, the
employer must make modifications or adjustments to enable disabled
employees to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as
are enjoyed by nondisabled employees. 7
The ADA provides four exceptions to an employer's duty to
provide reasonable accommodation to applicants or employees. First,
an employer need not accommodate a disabled applicant or employee
who is unqualified for the job.' EEOC Regulations define a qualified individual as one who "satisfies the requisite skill, experience,
education and other job-related requirements of the employment posimore than a de miniris cost. The report of the House Commission on Education and Labor
expressly rejected the application of this de minimis approach to reasonable accommodation
under the ADA:
The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) [sic] are not applicable to
this legislation ...
.Under the ADA, reasonable accommodations must be provided unless they rise to the level of "requiring significant difficulty or expense" on
the part of the employer, in light of the factors noted in the statute-i.e., a significantly higher standard than that articulated in Hardison.
H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 68.
65. Id. at 64.
66. The ADA imposes on employers the duty to modify both the work environment and
the job itself. Examples of altering the environment include making the workplace, break
rooms, restrooms, training rooms, and employer-provided transportation accessible to disabled
employees and applicants. Employers are not required to provide "personal use" items. Thus,
while employers must provide telephone headsets, magnifiers, readers, and interpreters, they
need not provide hearing aids, eyeglasses, or guide dogs. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o)
(1992); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 64.
Examples of altering the job itself include altering when or how the function is performed, reallocating marginal job functions, and reassigning the disabled employee to another
position. Employers are not required to reallocate essential job functions, and the reassignment
option is strictly limited to avoid segregation or discrimination. See 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.2(o) (1992); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 64.
The ADA does not require the employer to provide reasonable accommodation to an
employee or applicant if the only way to do so entails curing the disability. Thus, employers
are not required to provide rehabilitation for alcoholism or drug addiction; nor are they required to pay for an eye operation. See 135 CONG. REC. S10753-4, S10776-7 (daily ed. Sept.
7. 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin). They might, however, be required to give unpaid leave
for the individual to attend rehabilitation, particularly in the context of alcohol and drug
addiction. See cases cited infra note 110.
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(i)-(iii) (1992).
68. The general rule against discrimination states that "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a) (Supp. III
1992) (emhasis added).
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tion such individual holds or desires .... ."' If a law firm requires
all incoming lawyers to have graduated from an accredited law school
and to have passed the bar examination, the firm need not accommodate a disabled individual who has not met these selection criteria;
such an individual is not otherwise qualified for the position."
Second, an employer is not required by the ADA to accommodate
an applicant or employee unless that accommodation will enable the
applicant or employee to perform the essential functions of the position. 1 Application of this "essential functions" requirement indicates
two competing congressional concerns: Congress did not want to
force employers to hire employees who could not perform the job,'
but simultaneously wished to avoid giving employers the opportunity
to define the job so rigidly so as unnecessarily to exclude" disabled
applicants merely because of their inability to perform purely peripheral tasks.74 Congress compromised by stating that courts must con-

69. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1992).
70. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 65; 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m) (1992).
71. The Act defines a "qualified individual with a disability" (i.e., one covered by Title
I of the Act) as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position . . ." 42 U.S.C. §
12111(8) (Supp. I1 1992) (emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (1992)
(Reasonable accommodation includes "modifications or adjustments to the work environment,
or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily
performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the position." [emphasis added]). For application of the "essential functions" requirement under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see School Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987).
72. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 55-56.
73. For example, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), an employer
imposed a requirement that all applicants pass a written test. The employer, which before the
passage of Title VII had refused to promote African-Americans beyond the lowest department,
imposed the written test requirement immediately after Title VII went into effect, and did not
require white incumbents to pass the test. Although the Court held that the test violated Title VII because of its disparate impact on African-Americans, the facts recited above strongly
indicate that the employer introduced the test specifically to exclude African-Americans. By
this analysis, disparate treatment would have been a more appropriate standard for evaluating
the employer's actions. Similarly, employers may attempt to circumvent the ADA by imposing highly detailed, overly-restrictive job descriptions, which may have the same effect (disparate impact) as overt discrimination.
74. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 71.
The distinction between "primary duties" and "peripheral duties" has been much-litigated in the context of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982
& Supp. V 1987). Section 7 of the FLSA requires employers to pay overtime to an employee who works more than forty hours per week. Section 13(a)(1) exempts from the maximum
hour provision "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional" positions. Each of the
three exceptions requires ascertaining what constitutes the employee's "primary duty." See
Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1990) (defining an employee's "primary
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sider the employer's definition of essential job functions, but that this
consideration is neither conclusive nor presumptive.75

Third, an employer need not reasonably accommodate an applicant
or employee if doing so would "pose a direct threat to the health or

safety of other individuals in the workplace."76 The EEOC Regulations place a heavy burden on an employer who uses safety concerns
to justify a discharge or a refusal to hire.' An employer may not
rely on remote or speculative evidence, subjective perceptions, irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or stereotypes.78 The employer must
analyze the risks79 on a case-by-case basis; statistical probability is

duty" as the work performed by the employee that is of "principal value" to the employer,
regardless of whether that work encompasses more than 50% of the employee's work-time).
It remains to be seen whether the FLSA distinction between primary and peripheral
duties will be applied to the essential functions exception. The EEOC has issued a non-exclusive, non-conclusive list of factors for determining whether a particular function is essential.
According to the EEOC, a court must consider (i) the employer's judgment as to which
functions are essential; (ii) written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job; (iii) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv)
the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement; (vi) the work experience of past incumbents in the job;
and/or (vii) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(vii) (1992).
75. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, at 33; Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Note, Overcoming Barriers
to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. Rsv. 1423, 1442-43 (1991).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (Supp. II 1992). The statutory language seems to preclude a
paternalistic employer from refusing to hire an applicant with a disability for what the employer perceives to be the applicant's own good. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (Supp. IlI
1992) (citing "overprotective rules and policies" as an obstacle to be overcome); Cooper,
supra note 75 at 1448 n.146; Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act Interpreting the Title I Regulations: The Hard Cases, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL. 1, 8-12

(1992).
The EEOC Regulations, on the other hand, would allow an employer to reject such an
applicant:
An employer is also permitted to require that an individual not pose a direct threat
of harm to his or her own safety or health. If performing the particular functions
of a job would result in a high probability of substantial harm to the individual,
the employer could reject or discharge the individual unless a reasonable accommodation that would not cause an undue hardship would avert the harm.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1992).
77. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
78. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1992).
79. The regulations list four factors which the employer must consider
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm.
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irrelevant.' The employer must also consider whether a reasonable
accommodation would reduce the risk to a reasonable level."
Fourth, the ADA imposes no duty to accommodate where the
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation "would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the [employer's] business."'
"Undue hardship" refers to any accommodation that would be unduly
costly, extensive, substantial, disruptive, or that would fundamentally
alter the nature or operation of the business."
The ADA retains many of the same limitations as the Rehabilitation Act concerning what it means to be "disabled." One of these
limitations is that in order for a person to qualify for protection under
the law, the person must demonstrate that she has an "impairment."
This prerequisite is discussed in Part II of this article.
II.

THE CONCEPT OF "IMPAIRMEN'

In order to meet the ADA definition of "disability," a person
must demonstrate that she has a physical or mental impairment ihat
substantially limits one or more major life activities." The Rehabilitation Act regulations define "physical impairment" to mean a "physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss" affecting any of a list of body systems;' and define "mental
impairment" as "any mental or psychological disorder," listing several
examples.' The original ADA bill incorporated these definitions verbatim into the proposed statutory language," but Congress eventually
deleted them in the interest of brevity." The ADA Committee reports, however, retained the language as the Committees' understanding of the meaning of the terms "physical or mental impairment."'89
The EEOC Regulations also adopt this same language.' The
Regulations state:

80. Id.
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp. I1 1992); H.R. REP. No. 485, pi. 2, at 76; Cooper, supra note 75, at 1448.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. 11 1992).
83. 29 C.F.L app. § 1630.2(p) (1992).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. I 1991).
85. 45 C.F.RL § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1992).
86. 45 C.F.R § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(B) (1992).
87. S. 2345, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S5110 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1988).
88. Burgdorf, supra note 33, at 446.
89. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989).
90. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1992).
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(h) Physical or mental impairment means:

(1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive,
digestive, genito-urinary, heoic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and

specific learning disabilities.9'

The appendix to the EEOC Regulations explains that "the existence of an impairment is to be determined without regard to mitigating factors such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."'
For example, an individual with epilepsy is considered impaired even

if her symptoms are completely controlled by medicine.' Similarly,
an individual with a hearing loss is considered impaired even if the

loss is correctable by a hearing aid.'
As a general matter, "impairment" should be defined broadly.95

The ADA Committee Reports, borrowing from the Rehabilitation Act
Regulations,' provide a non-exhaustive list of conditions intended to
be included within the definition of "impairment."' These conditions
include

orthopedic,"

visual,"

speech,'"

and

hearing

impair-

91. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (1992).
92. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1992).
93. Id.
94. Id However, the EEOC Regulations indicate that minor vision problems which may
be corrected with glasses would not necessarily "substantially limit" a person's ability to
work. For example, an individual who cannot be a commercial airline pilot because of a
minor vision impairment, but who can be a commercial airline co-pilot or a pilot for a courier service, would not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working. 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.2j) (1992).
95. See, e.g., Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983) (defining "impairment" as "any condition which weakens, diminishes, restricts, or otherwise damages an
individual's health or physical or mental activity."); see also E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall,
497 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 (D. Haw. 1980) (same); c Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding that neither PKD nor end-stage renal condition "rise[s] to the level of a
'physical impairment' within the meaning of the Ac.").
96. 42 Fed. Reg. 22685-94 (May 4, 1977).
97. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sass. 22 (1989); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 51;
H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, at 28.
98. See Sisson v. Helms, 751 F.2d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 841
(1985) (ankylosing spondylitis); Guinn v. Bolger, 598 F. Supp. 196, 198 (D.D.C. 1984), judgment vacated by stipulation (1985) (permanent osteoarthritis of the knee joints).
99. See Norcross v. Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 114 (8th Cir. 1985) (legal blindness); Holly v.
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ments; °1 cerebral palsy; re epilepsy;

°3

muscular dystrophy; multi-

ple sclerosis;" cancer;"e heart disease;" 6 diabetes;"e mental retardation; a emotional illness;"e drug addiction;.. alcoholism; 1

City of Naperville, 603 F. Supp. 220, 223 (N.D. Ml. 1985) (blindness in one eye); but see
Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that a person is not
disabled if his vision can be corrected to 20/200).
100. Cf Reeder v. Frank, 813 F. Supp. 773, (D. Utah 1992), affd, 986 F.2d 1428 (10th
Cir. 1993).
101. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). The Davis
decision is predicated on the assumption that the plaintiff in that case, who had a major
hearing deficiency, was in fact disabled. The Court, however, held that she was not entitled
to accommodation because the accommodations she proposed would have compromised the
"essential nature" of the nursing program she sought to enter. Id. at 414.
102. Fitzgerald v. Green Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1135-36 (S.D. Iowa
1984).
103. Estate of Reynolds v. Dole, 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1848 (N.D. Cal. 1990),
at'd, 985 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1993); Fitzgerald v. Green Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp.
1130, 1135-36 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (concluding that nocturnal epilepsy constitutes a handicap as
defined in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
104. See Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1382 (10th Cir.
1981).
105. See Katradis v. Day-El of Washington, DC, 846 F.2d 1482, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
106. See Bento v. I.T.O. Corp. of R.I., 599 F. Supp. 731, 741 (D.R.I. 1984); Treadwell
v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 474 (l1th Cir. 1983).
107. Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 437, 438 n.3 (8th Cit. 1993).
108. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1323 (E.D. Pa.
1978), affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); See also Kent
v. Derwinski, 790 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 (E.D. Wash. 1991); Ciocco v. City of Philadelphia,
No. CIV,A.89-4097, 1990 WL 166389, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 1990).
109. See Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that it was unduly
burdensome to require defendant to reassign employee with manic depressive syndrome in a
foreign country); Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (lth Cir. 1983) (concluding that
nervous condition combined with heart disease constitutes a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973).
110. Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Burka v. New York
City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Wallace v. Veterans Admin., 683
F. Supp. 758, 761 (D. Kan. 1988).
111. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 555 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("It is beyond dispute that petitioners, as alcoholics, were handicapped
individuals covered by the Act."); Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511, 517
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992); Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d 558, 561 (9th
Cir. 1990); Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 141-42
(8th Cir. 1987); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126, 129 (D.D.C. 1984), affd 790 F.2d
964 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Wendy K. Voss, Note, Employing the Alcoholic Under the Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 895, 911-14 (1992). Voss notes
that a "tension exists between the stated requirements for disabled status, which demand caseby-case analysis, and the nearly per se definition of alcoholism as a handicap the federal
government and courts [have] adopted under the Rehabilitation Act" Voss argues that courts
should adopt the case-by-case approach when interpreting the ADA, because a per se approach "begs the question of whether an alcoholic claimant must prove that he is regarded
by this employer as 'having such an impairment,' or whether society's generalized prejudice
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and infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus."' In addition, courts construing the Rehabilitation Act have found such diverse

conditions as the following to constitute impairments: chronic tuberculosis,"' dyslexia,"" and hypersensitivity to tobacco smoke."'

Although broad, "impairment" is not all-inclusive. The Appendix
to the EEOC Regulations make clear that mere physical characteristics
such as eye color, left-handedness,"'6 or height or weight within

"normal" range are not covered;" 7 nor are environmental, cultural,

or economic disadvantages such as poverty, lack of education, or a

prison record."' Other conditions or characteristics that are not included within the definition of impairment include:" 9 characteristic
predisposition to illness or disease, pregnancy, poor judgment or a
quick temper when not a symptom of a mental or psychological
disorder,' transitory ailments, 2 ' and advanced age." In addition,
Congress specifically excluded the following conditions from the defi-

nition of disability:
(a) homosexuality or bisexuality;
(b) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments or other sexual behavior disorders;
(c) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or

is sufficient to allow him to qualify for preferred status under the Act." MLat 912.
112. See Justice Department Memorandum on Application of Rehabilitation Act's Section
504 to HIV-infected Persons (September 27, 1988); OFCCP Federal Contract Compliance
Manual Appendix 6D subd. 4; see also Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701,

704 (9th Cir. 1988).
113. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
114. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991); Fitzgerald v.
Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
115. Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
116. See Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986).
117. Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); but see Cook
v. State, No. 93-1093, 1993 WL 470697 (1st Cir. Nov. 22, 1993) (holding that morbid obesity is a disability).
118. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1992).
119. IL
120. Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1989).
121. Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
122. Although medical conditions associated with the aging process, such as hearing loss,
osteoporosis, and arthritis, would constitute impairments. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1992).
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(d)psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current use
of illegal drugs.'

These substantial limitations on the otherwise-broad definition of
"impairment' impose an effective limitation on the scope of the Act,
and prevent mere "difference" from being protected as "disabled."
This is consistent with the Congressional purpose of limiting the
protection of the Act to those who truly require such protection."
An employer's attitudes and actions, however, can transform even a
seemingly insignificant health condition into a meaningful employment barrier within the spirit of the term "impairment." 1' The next
section of this article examines how the ADA accounts for employer
attitudes.
I.

THE "REGARDED AS" TEST

A. The Act and the Regulations
Conditions that do not inherently interfere with major life activities may become substantially limiting as a result of other people's
reactions to the conditions." s For this reason, Congress added the
"regarded as" prong to the definition of disability;'" this allows
persons who are regarded as disabled - but who are not in fact
disabled - to avail themselves of the protection afforded by the
ADA." The EEOC Regulations provide that "regarded as" means:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as
constituting such a limitation;

123. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (Supp. I 1992).
124. See infra Part 1V-D.
125. Andrew W. Haines, E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A Penetrating Interpretation of
"Handicapped Individual" for Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
for Various State Equal Employment Opportunity Statutes, 16 LoY. L.A. L.R~v. 527, 542
(1983).
126. TowARD INDEPENDENCF, supra note 29, at A-24; School Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283-84 (1987).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (Supp. II 1992).

128. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2 (1992). The most obvious example is persons with severe
facial disfigurements.
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(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward
such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraphs (h)(1) or
(2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a
substantially limiting impairment."
An individual satisfies the first part of this definition if she has an
impairment that is not substantially limiting but for the attitude of an
employer." For example, suppose an individual has controlled high
blood pressure that is not substantially limiting - i.e., that does not
significantly interfere with any of her normal life activities. If an
employer reassigns or refuses to hire this individual because of unsubstantiated fears that the individual will suffer a heart attack, the
employer regards the individual as disabled. 3 '
The second part of the "regarded as" definition is satisfied if an
individual has an impairment that is not substantially limiting but for
the attitude of third parties.'32 For example, suppose an individual
has a prominent facial scar or disfigurement. If an employer discriminates against this individual because of the negative reactions of customers, the employer regards the individual as disabled.'
An individual satisfies the third part of the "regarded as" definition if the employer "erroneously believes the individual has a substantially limiting impairment that the individual actually does not
have."" Suppose, for example, that an employer hears a rumor that
one of his employees is infected with HIV, and discharges the employee on this basis. Even if the rumor is totally unfounded and the
individual has no impairment, the individual is protected by the ADA
because the employer regards the individual as disabled." Similarly,
if an employer regards a bum victim or an obese employee as disfigured, and consequently acts to minimize the employee's contact with
customers or clients, the employee should be considered "regarded as"

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1992).
29 C.F.RL app. § 1630.20) (1992).
Id
d
Il
Id
Id
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disabled and entitled to protection under the Act.

Congress made it quite clear that it intended the "regarded as"
test to be construed as extremely broad.1" The House Judiciary Report, for example, notes that:
a person who is rejected from a job because of the myths, fears and
stereotypes associated with disabilities would be covered under [the
"regarded as"] test, whether or not the employer's perception is
shared by others in the field and whether or not the person's physical or mental condition would be considered a disability under the
first or second part of the definition.'"

The same report also states:
In the employment context, if a person is disqualified on the basis
of an actual or perceived physical or mental condition, and the
employer can articulate no legitimate job-related reason for the
rejection, a perceived concern about employing persons with disabilities could be inferred and the plaintiff would qualify for coverage under the "regarded as" test . .. .

Similar language is used in the EEOC Regulations.139
B.

One Exclusion Is Not Enough

Courts construing the "regarded as" test of the Rehabilitation Act
have almost universally concluded that an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee
incapable of performing a single job or a narrow range of jobs.1"

136. H.R. REp. No. 485, pt. 3, at 30 (1990).
137. Id. (emphasis added); see also E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088,
1097 (D. Haw. 1980) ('It is of little solace to a person denied employment to know that the
employer's view of his or her condition is erroneous.'.
138. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, at 30-31.
139. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(t) (1992).
140. See, e.g., Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1993); Sanford v.
Stern, 980 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1992) (text of decision reproduced in Westlaw); Daley v.
Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir.
1986); Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, 783 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 (D.R.I.
1992); Goerlich v. Davis, No. 91 C 1743, 1991 WL 195772 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 1991);
Scharff v. Frank, 791 F. Supp. 182, 187 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Taylor v. United States Postal
Serv., 771 F. Supp. 882, 889 (S.D. Ohio 1990), rev'd, 946 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1991); Miller
v. AT & T Network Sys., 722 F. Supp. 633 (D. Or. 1989), affd and opinion adopted, 915
F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990); Elstner v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 659 F. Supp. 1328, 1343
(S.D. Tex. 1987), afd, 863 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1988); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F.
Supp. 739 (D.C. Cal. 1984); see also Anna Phipps Engh, Note, The Rehabilitation Act of
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For example, in Reeder v. Frank,4' an employee (Reeder) with a
speech impediment applied for a promotion which would have involved a "fairly heavy use of the telephone."'42 Reeder's application
was rejected." Reeder alleged in his pleadings that he was told by
his supervisor that he was not given the job because of his speech
impediment; the supervisor acknowledged that the impediment was "a
minor factor" in his decision not to award Reeder the promotion."
The court, on a motion for summary judgment, ruled first that
Reeder's speech impediment was not a "substantial impairment" because, despite the impediment, Reeder was still able to communicate
"intelligibly.""'4 The court next considered whether the supervisor
had regarded Reeder as having an impairment. The court found the
supervisor had not. Citing Forrisi v. Bowen" for the proposition
that "an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as handicapped simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying
the singular demands of a particular job,"'47 the court stated,
"Reeder was denied the [promotion] in part because it required heavy
use of the telephone. However, this does not demonstrate that the
Postal Service regarded Reeder as having a handicap."' "

1973: Focusing the Definition of a Handicapped Individual, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 149,
169-72 (1988); cf Taylor v. United States Postal Serm., 946 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1991)
(acknowledging that "a per se rule that permitted every unsuccessful applicant who was re-

jected" due to a real or perceived impairment "would stand the act on its head," but rejecting a per se rule that would "never permiti] an unsuccessful job applicant to prove he was
perceived as being handicapped by pointing to the fact that he did not possess a so-called
job requirement due to a physical impairment").
141. 813 F. Supp. 773 (D. Utah 1992), arf'd, 986 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1993). The affirmance of the Tenth Circuit is listed in the Federal Reporters in a table. The circuit court's
short opinion, however, is reproduced in Westlaw. Regarding Reeder's Rehabilitation Act
claims, the court stated simply:
As to Reeder's § 501 claim, we affirm for substantially the reasons given by the
district court the conclusion that Reeder did not qualify as a handicapped person
under the Act. . .. Because Reeder's § 504 claim also requires an initial determination that the individual is handicapped, we dismiss as moot Reeder's request
to reconsider our decision in Johnson v. United States Postal Service ....
986 F.2d 1428 (text available in Westlaw).
142. Reeder, 813 F. Supp. at 782.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 781.
794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
Reeder, 813 F. Supp. at 782.
Reeder, 813 F. Supp. at 782. The court continued:

The telecommunications detail was merely one employment position. The Postal

Service's refusal to grant Reeder this detail does not suggest that he would be
precluded, generally, from the type of employment in which he is currently en-
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These two sentences are utterly incomprehensible. If Reeder's
supervisor denied him the promotion because of his disability, how
can it be that the supervisor did not regard Reeder as disabled? The
courts' unconvincing answer to this question is the subject of Part IV
of this article.
IV.

THE "SUBSTANTIALLY LIMNED" TEST
AS iT PERTAINS TO WORK

A. The Judicial Approach to the Rehabilitation Act
1. E. E. Black and the "substantially limits" test
The Rehabilitation Act definition of "handicapped" is identical to
the ADA definition of "disability": both impose a three-part test, the
first prong of which requires a plaintiff to prove that she has an
impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities. 49 The seminal Rehabilitation Act case interpreting the "substantially limits" test is E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall."
George Crosby, the plaintiff in E. E. Black, was an aspiring carpenter, who entered an apprenticeship program which required 8000
hours of work in the field."' After he had accumulated approximately 3600 hours, Crosby applied for employment as a carpenter's apprentice with E. E. Black, Ltd., a general construction contractor.5 2
Black required all applicants to take a pre-employment physical examination." When Crosby was examined, doctors discovered a congenital back anomaly, on which basis Black denied Crosby's employment
application." Crosby filed a complaint against Black under Section
503 of the Rehabilitation Act, arguing that Black had discriminated
against him on the basis of handicap." Crosby testified that because
gaged, or for which he has received his training. The record clearly demonstrates
that, during the course of Reeder's employment with the Postal Service, he has
advanced from a craft employee, level 3, to management, level 14. Therefore, the
Court concludes that Reeder's allegations and the evidence he has produced do not
demonstrate the Postal Service regards Reeder as handicapped.
Id
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
private

29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(a) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. 11 1992).
497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
Id4 at 1091.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id. at 1092. Black failed to raise the issue of whether § 503 grants individuals a
right of action. Subsequent cases have held that it does not. See, e.g., Hodges v.
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of Black's refusal to employ him he had great difficulty obtaining
employment as a carpenter's apprentice, and had been unable to get
the apprenticeship hours needed to become a fully qualified carpenter.1" The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
("OFCCP") of the Department of Labor investigated and issued an
administrative complaint."5
A hearing was then held before an Administrative Law Judge,
who found that Black had regarded Crosby as having an impairment,
and that this had caused Crosby to have-difficulty obtaining employment. 58 However, the Judge held that in order for Crosby to prove
that his impairment was "substantially limiting," he had to prove that
the impairment "impeded activities relevant to many or most
jobs." 59 Because Crosby had only shown that his impairment limited
his ability to be a carpenter's apprentice, the Judge ruled that Crosby
was not a handicapped individual and thus was not protected by the
Rehabilitation Act."
Crosby appealed to the Assistant Secretary of Labor. 6 ' Although
the Assistant Secretary agreed with the Administrative Law Judge's
findings of fact," the Assistant Secretary interpreted the "substantially limiting" requirement much more broadly. " He found that
coverage under the Rehabilitation Act did not require a showing that
the impairment impeded activities relevant to many or most jobs, but
rather that protection "under the Act is extended to every individual
with an impairment which is a current bar to employment which the
individual is currently capable of performing .... It is sufficient that
the impairment is a current bar to the employment of one's
choice . . . ."" I call the Assistant Secretary's test the "once is
enough" approach, because exclusion from even one job is deemed
sufficient to constitute a substantial limitation to employment.
The district court rejected both the Administrative Law Judge's

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 728 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 822
(1984); Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 976 (1982); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1085 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 889 (1980).
156. E. E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1091.
157. Id. at 1093.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1099.
160. Id. at 1093.
161. Id. at 1094.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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and the Assistant Secretary's definitions of the "substantially limiting"
requirement.'" Regarding the Judge's assertion that a plaintiff must
show that the impairment impeded "many or most jobs," the court
held that this definition "drastically reduces the coverage of the Act,
and undercuts the purposes for which the Act was intended."'" The
court noted:
A person... who has obtained a graduate degree in chemistry, and
is then turned down for a chemist's job because of an impairment,
is not likely to be heartened by the news that he can still be a
streetcar conductor, an attorney or a forest ranger. A person who is
disqualified from employment in his chosen field has a substantial
handicap to employment, and is substantially limited in one of his
major life activities.'"
However, the district court also rejected the interpretation of the
Assistant Secretary, who had argued that an impairment is substantially limiting if it impedes the employment of one's choice.'" This,
the court held, contravened the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act: If Congress had intended this interpretation, it would not
have required an "impairment that substantially limits one or more
life activities," but would have used the terms "any handicap to employment" or "in any way limits one or more of such person's major
life activities."'" Congress did not intend, the court concluded, to
protect individuals whose impairments had impeded them merely from
acquiring the job of their choice. ' Instead of relying on the brightline tests of either the Administrative Law Judge or the Assistant
Secretary, the district court ruled that decisions about whether an
impairment is substantially limiting in the major life activity of work
should be made on a case-by-case basis.' The court gave three fac-

165. Id. at 1099.
166. Id
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id ; see also Reeder v. Frank, 813 F. Supp. 773, aff'd, 986 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.
1993); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986); Tudyman v. United Airlines,
608 F. Supp. 739, 745 (D. Cal. 1984); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 636

(Utah 1983).
170. E. E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1099. For a list of other Rehabilitation Act cases with
the same holding, see infra note 190.
171. E. E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1100; see also Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d
560, 565 (7th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. United States Postal Serv., 946 F.2d 1214, 1217 (6th Cir.
1991); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986); Scharff v. Frank, 791 F. Supp.
182, 187 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
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tors which it deemed appropriate for consideration."
First,
decisionmakers should consider the number and types of jobs from
which the impaired individual is disqualified."73 In making this determination, "it must be assumed that all employers offering the same
job or similar jobs would use the same requirement or screening
process."'74 The purpose of this qualification is to prevent employers
from imposing an aberrational but discriminatory job qualification,
and then arguing that because the qualification is unique, it is not a
substantial handicap to employment, and that for this reason the applicant is not protected as disabled. 7
Second, decisionmakers should consider the geographical area to
which the impaired individual has reasonable access.'76 An applicant
should not be forced to move across the country to obtain a substantially equivalent job.
Third, decisionmakers should consider the applicant individually,
taking into account the applicant's job expectations and training."
Crosby, for example, had already worked 3600 hours toward the 8000
hour requirement of becoming a master carpenter. 78 If Crosby had
been denied the opportunity to finish his apprenticeship, he would
have lost a substantial amount of human capital investment.
After applying the foregoing factors to the facts of Crosby's case,
the district court concluded that Crosby's impairment "constituted...
a substantial handicap to employment,"' " and denied Black's motion
for summary judgment." Other courts, construing similar Rehabilitation Act cases, have rejected the "once is enough" approach in favor
of the multi-factored E. E. Black approach.' Courts have done so
for two reasons. First, they argue that the substantial limitation requirement must be interpreted broadly to restrict the definition of

172. Id. For other cases applying this three-part test, see Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979
F.2d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1992); Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933 (4th Cir. 1986); Jasany
v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985); James v. Runyon, No.

ClV.A.92-2262, 1992 WL 382311, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 1992); Scharff v. Frank, 791 F.
Supp. 182, 187 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Coley v. Secretary of the Army, 689 F. Supp. 519 (D.
Md. 1987); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1185 (D. Md. 1985).
173. E. E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1100.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Ikd
Id.
1&.at 1101.
Id.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1102.

180. Id. at 1104.

181. See supra text accompanying note 164; see also cases cited supra note 172.
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"disability" so that only persons with "major" disabilities will be
protected. For example, in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 2 the
court stated:
Most or all persons have some physical or mental deviations from a
norm or from personal or employer aspirations. Considerations of
height, weight, sensory abilities, speech, pulse rate, blood pressure,
and a whole variety of measures of mental ability are only a few
characteristics whose variations can be deemed "impairments" ....13
The Fourth Circuit in Forrisi v. Bowen"8 likewise stated:
The statutory language, requiring a substantiallimitation of a major
life activity, emphasizes that the impairment must be a significant
one ...

The Rehabilitation Act assures that truly disabled, but

genuinely capable, individuals will not face discrimination in employment because of stereotypes about the insurmountability of their
handicaps. It would debase this high purpose if the statutory protection available to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone whose disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was widely shared. Indeed, the very concept of an impairment implies a characteristic that is not commonplace and that poses
for the particular individual a more general disadvantage in his or
her search for satisfactory employment."
The Forrisi court's analysis contains its own two-part refutation.
First, the court acknowledges the congressional intent to prohibit
discrimination "because of stereotypes about the insurmountability of'
handicaps. This intent is frustrated, however, when employers are
given, as in Forrisi, carte blanche to discriminate simply because the
employee can obtain another job with another employer." Second,
the Forrisi court recognizes that "the very concept of an impairment

182. 674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983) (interpreting a Utah statute the language of which was, in
relevant part, identical to that of the Rehabilitation Act).
183. Id, at 636; see also Reeder v. Frank, 813 F. Supp. 773 (D. Utah 1992), aft'd, 986
F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah
1983)).
184. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
185. Id. at 933-34 (emphasis supplied); see also Maulding v. Sullivan, 961 F.2d 694, 698
(8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 1255 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff who had shown
that her impairment prevented her from doing lab work, but which did not prevent her from
performing many of her other job duties, failed to prove that her impairment substantially
limited her employment as a whole).
186. See infra Part IV-D (discussing the congressional intent behind the ADA).
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implies a characteristic that is not commonplace and that poses for
the particular individual a more general disadvantage in his or her
search for satisfactory employment.""' The statutory and judicial

definitions of "impairment" adequately limit the class of persons protected by the Act." It was therefore not necessary for the Forrisi
court to interpret the "substantial limitation" requirement to accomplish this same purpose.
The second ground upon which courts have justified adopting the
multi-factored E. E. Black approach instead of the "once is enough"
approach is that the former approach is dictated by the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act."s According to this reasoning, a
narrow interpretation of the "substantially limits" requirement would
render the phrase mere surplusage. If Congress had intended that an

impairment be considered substantially limiting merely because it
impedes the employment of one's choice, Congress would not have
required an "impairment that substantially limits one or more life
activities." Instead, Congress would have stopped with the word "impairment."'19
This is nonsense. The "substantially limits" phrase can easily be
interpreted in a meaningful way that still permits courts to find that
the loss of a single job by an individual "substantially limits" that

187. Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
188. See supra Part I.
189. E.E.Black, 497 F.Supp. at 1090.
190. Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1419 (10th Cir. 1992); Forrisi v. Bowen,
794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986); Reeder v. Frank, 813 F. Supp. 773, (D. Utah 1992),
aft'd, 986 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1993); Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 745
(D.C. Cal. 1984); E. E.Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1099 (D. Haw. 1980);
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1983); see also Haines, supra note
125, at 545:
[If] one also adopts a qualitative analysis, the statutory definition becomes greatly
complicated, as does the identification task of employers; for, in effect, the qualitative interpretation connotes an expansion of the statutory definition to encompass
every rejection by every statutorily covered employer because the decision based on
the health condition amounts to a "substantial limitation." In essence, this qualitative analysis appears to "trivialize"' the phrase "substantially limits" to the point
that the latter seems boundless and hence rather nonsensical.
I (citation omitted). Nonetheless, Haines concludes:
Notwithstanding the above fear and projected difficulty with the qualitative
analysis, social realities compel use of a qualitative analysis in interpreting the
phrase "substantially limits." Situations arise where the loss of even a single job
by an individual based on an "impairment" surely comes within the meaning of
"substantially limits," owing to the privation coming within the spirit of the term
"handicap."
lIdat 545-46.
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individual in the major life activity of working. The phrase could, for
example, be used to distinguish between "major" terms and conditions
of employment - those which affect pay, advancement, and job
satisfaction - from "minor" terms and conditions of employment which do not. Suppose, for example, that an employer accommodates
a disabled individual by reassigning her to a different (but equal in
terms of pay, advancement, job satisfaction, et cetera) position.19
The employee, however, is dissatisfied with the reassignment, and demands her original job back with substantial alternative accommodations. A court might use the "substantially limits" clause to hold
that although the job reassignment "affects" the employee, it does not
"substantially limit" her in the life activity of working.
Suppose, alternatively, that an employer reallocates the job duties
of a secretarial pool to accommodate a deaf secretary who cannot use
an audial telephone. The employer relieves the deaf secretary of her
telephone duties, and in place assigns her a proportionally equal share
of extra typing work. The deaf secretary, unhappy with this arrangement, demands that the employer equip her with a TDD, allow
her to retain the telephone duties that other secretaries have, and stop
giving her the extra typing work. Again, a court might hold that
although the employer's proposed accommodation "affects" the deaf
employee, it does not "substantially limit" her ability to work. It is
thus clear that the "substantially limits" phrase can be meaningfully
interpreted in a way that permits courts to find that a person's employment opportunities are "substantially limited" when she is excluded from even one job because she is

-

or is regarded as

-

dis-

abled.
2. The injection of the "substantially limits" test into the
"regarded as" prong of the definition of "disability"
The discussion in E. E. Black was primarily directed at whether
the plaintiff was actually handicapped - i.e., whether he met the first
prong of the Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability. Both E. E.
Black"re and subsequent Rehabilitation Act cases,1" however, have

191. For a comprehensive discussion of job reassignment, see R. Bales, Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Conflicts Between Reasonable Accommodation and Collective
Bargaining,2 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. PoL. 161 (1992).
192. 497 F. Supp. at 1100.
193. See, e.g., Mowat v. Transportation Unlimited, Inc., 984 F.2d 230, (8th Cir. 1992);
Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1992); Reeder v. Frank, 813 F.
Supp. 773 (1). Utah 1992), aft'd, 986 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1993); Torres v. Bolger, 610 F.
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also applied this case-by-case, multi-factored approach to cases in
which the plaintiff claims she is regarded as disabled. In these cases,
courts import the "substantial limitation" requirement of the first
prong of the definition of disability into the third prong of the definition. For example, in Miller v. AT & T Network Systems,"9 a telephone company employee was fired from his job installing telephones
because his asthma and medically-induced heat sensitivity made it
impossible for him to accept temporary transfers to extremely hot
parts of the country. 95 The plaintiff sued, arguing first that he was a
disabled person under the statute; and second that even if he was not
in fact disabled, his employer regarded him as disabled." Citing
E. E. Black, the Miller court held that the plaintiff was not disabled
because "[a]n impairment which only interferes with an individual's
ability to do one particular job with one particular employer, but
which does not significantly decrease the individual's ability to obtain
satisfactory employment otherwise, is not 'substantially' limiting within the meaning of the statute."'" Concerning the plaintiff's claim
that he was "regarded as" disabled, the court held that the same analysis precluded a finding that the employee was regarded as disabled:
An employer does not necessarily regard an employee as handicapped simply by finding that the employee is incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job. The statutory reference
to a "substantial" limitation indicates instead that an employer regards an employee as handicapped in his ability to work by finding
the employee's impairment to foreclose generally the type of employment involved."
In other words, the employee must prove that if the employer's
erroneous perception of the employee's condition had been accurate,
that condition would have foreclosed the employee's employment
opportunities generally. It is not enough, according to the courts, for
an employee to prove that the employer's erroneous perception of the
employee's condition caused the employer to deny the employee a
specific job.

Supp. 593, 597 (N.D. Tex. 1985), affid on other grounds, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986).
194. 722 F. Supp. 633 (D. Or. 1989), affd and opinion adopted, 915 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.
1990) (construing an Oregon statute as identical, in relevant part, to the Rehabilitation Act).
195. L at 637-38.
196. Id at 639-40.
197. Id. at 639.
198. Id. at 640 (citing Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986)).
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This interpretation has placed an onerous burden for employees to
carry; such burden is illustrated by the fact that very few employees

have managed to get past summary judgment on the issue. In Scharff
v. Frank,'" the plaintiff alleged that the United States Post Office
denied her employment application for a letter carrier position because

the Post Office regarded her as handicapped due to her history of
musculoskeletal injuries.

The Post Office admitted it regarded the

plaintiff as impaired, but contended that her impairment only limited
her ability to perform the specific job of letter carrier." The court
implied that if the Post Office had regarded her as unable to perform

only a single job, the plaintiff would be unprotected by the Act.'
The court noted, however, that the plaintiff had presented evidence
that if she did in fact have the physical impairment the Post Office
had regarded her as having, she would be unable to perform approxi-

mately half the unskilled jobs in the local economy.' Based on this
evidence, the court denied the Post Office's motion for summary
judgment.'
The outcome of Schaiff is unusual - nearly every other case in
which the plaintiff has argued that an employer's erroneous perception
of impairment substantially limited the plaintiff's ability to work has
been decided in the employer's favor.'

The injection of this inter-

pretation of the "substantially limited" test into the "regarded as"
prong of the definition of disability has thus further diminished the

protection afforded by the Rehabilitation Act.

199. 791 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
200. Id. at 183-84.
201. Id at 185.
202. Id. at 187.
203. Id. at 186-87.
204. Id. at 187.
205. See, e.g., Mowat v. Transportation Unlimited, Inc., 984 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1992)
(plaintiff alleged that his employer regarded his shoulder injury, which rendered the plaintiff
unable to lift objects above shoulder-height as disabling; court granted employer's motion for
summary judgment); Byrne v. Board of Educ., 979 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff alleged
that her employer regarded her allergy to fungus as disabling; court entered judgment for
employer on jury verdict); Reeder v. Frank, 813 F. Supp. 773, (D. Utah 1992), aft'd, 986
F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1993) (plaintiff alleged that his employer regarded his speech impediment as disabling; court granted employer's motion for summary judgment); Torres v. Bolger,
610 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986)
(plaintiff alleged that his employer regarded his left-handedness as disabling; court granted
judgment for employer after bench trial); but see Cook v. State, No. 93-1093, 1993 WL
470697, at *5 (1st Cir. Nov. 22, 1993) (affirming judgment for plaintiff who proved that her
employer erroneously believed that her morbid obesity "foreclosed a broad range of employment options in the health care industry").
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The EEOC Approach to the ADA

Like E. E. Black, the EEOC Regulations to the ADA adopt a
case-by-case, multi-factored approach to deciding whether a person
is substantially limited in the major life activity of working. The
regulations explicitly reject the "once is enough" approach, and instead assert that the "inability to perform a single, particular job does
not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working."' The EEOC gives three factors which courts are to consider.'
First, courts should consider "[t]he geographical area to. which the
individual has reasonable access."' Although this factor is not discussed in the regulations in any more detail, it presumably reflects
the E. E. Black court's judgment that an applicant should not be
expected to move across the country to obtain a substantially equivalent job.210
Second, courts should consider "[t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or
abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is
also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs) ....
The regulations cite as an example an individual who has a back
condition preventing him from performing any heavy labor.' He is
substantially limited in the activity of working because his back condition eliminates his ability to perform a class of jobs (heavy labor).2 3 This would be the case even if he were able to perform jobs
in another class (e.g., semi-skilled jobs).1 4
Third, the EEOC Regulations state that courts should consider
[t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified because of
an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing
similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geograph-

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1992).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1992).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (1992).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(ii)(A) (1992).
E. E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1101.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(ii)(B) (1992).
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1992).
Id.
Id.
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ical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of
the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes)." '
The regulations cite as an example an individual who is allergic to a
substance found in most high-rise office buildings, but seldom found
elsewhere, that makes breathing extremely difficult." 6 The allergy
substantially limits this individual's ability to perform a broad range
of jobs in various classes that are conducted in high-rise office buildings, and hence the individual is substantially limited in her ability to

work.

217

C.

Flaws in the Rehabilitation Act and EEOC Approaches

As discussed supra in Parts IV-B and IV-C, both the judicial
approach to the Rehabilitation Act and the EEOC approach to the
ADA use a case-by-case, multi-factored approach to determine whether a person is substantially limited in the major life activity of working.218 Because each approach adopts a somewhat different set of
factors to be considered, criticism of one approach is not necessarily
applicable to the other. On the other hand, the two approaches are
sufficiently similar to justify discussing their many shortcomings
together.
1.

The EEOC Regulations inadequately account for
the employee's training and expectations

Conspicuously understated in the EEOC Regulations' list of factors to be considered is the E. E. Black court's third factor: the individual plaintiff's training and job expectations. 219 This factor was
critical to the outcome of E. E. Black.' There, Crosby (the plaintiff) had already worked 3600 hours toward the 8000-hour requirement of becoming a master carpenter." A judicial pronouncement
that Crosby is not "substantially limited" in his employment opportunities because he is fully capable of becoming an electrician or a

plumber would ignore Crosby's training and expectations.
The EEOC's second factor (the class of jobs from which the

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C) (1992).
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1992).
Id.
Id.
E. E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1101.
Id. at 1101-02.
Id. at 1091.
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plaintiff is excluded) is supposed to take into account "training,
knowledge, skills, and abilities.'" The example which the regula-

tions provide to illustrate this factor (an individual with a back condition that precludes any heavy labor), however, emphasizes the

regulations' apparent requirement that the plaintiff be excluded from a
broad class of jobs.' If Crosby's training and experience had been
in constructing doors, and his disability precluded only doormaking,

but not carpentry in general, it is unclear whether the EEOC regulations would permit the conclusion that Crosby was "substantially
limited" in his ability to work. A better approach would be to remove
entirely the focus on whether other jobs are available; a person in
Crosby's situation should be protected whether his disability precludes
him from the broad occupation of carpentry or the narrow specialty
of door construction.
2. The Rehabilitation Act cases' emphasis on the employee's
training and expectations restricts the protection

afforded to nonskilled employees
Even if the EEOC Regulations are interpreted to account fully for
employees' training and job expectations, this increased protection for
experienced and well-trained employees is likely to come at the expense of those less experienced and less well-trained.' This is so
because both the Rehabilitation Act approach and the EEOC approach

require the plaintiff to show that there are no (or very few) jobs
available which mirror her experience and qualifications.'

A spe-

cialized employee is likely to have little difficulty making such a

222. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B) (1992).
223. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1992).
224. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States Postal Serv., 771 F. Supp. 882, 888 (S.D. Ohio
1990), rev'd, 946 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the plaintiff's "lack of specialized training leaves him without the argument that his physical impairment prevents him from
performing a job for which he [was] uniquely qualified"); see also Haines, supra note 125,
at 546 (noting that "even an applicant who does not possess special training can experience
[a] qualitative employment loss.").
225. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1992); but see Cook v. State, No. 93-1093, 1993 WL
470697 (1st Cir. Nov. 22, 1993):
an applicant need not subject herself to a lengthy series of rejections at the hands
of an insensitive employer to establish that the employer views her limitations as
substantial. If the rationale proffered by an employer in the context of a single
refusal to hire adequately evinces that the employer treats a particular condition as
a disqualifier for a wide range of employment opportunities, proof of a far-flung
pattern of rejections may not be necessary.

Id. at *6.
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showing. There are, for example, a limited number of job openings in
Corpus Christi, Texas for doctors specializing in winter sports-related
injuries. There are likely to be plenty of openings, however, for burger-flippers and dock workers.
ADA protection should be available to all employees
skilled
and unskilled alike. The only way to protect the training and expectations of skilled employees while simultaneously protecting unskilled
employees is to remove the requirement that plaintiffs prove that
there are no other jobs available. The "once is enough" approach
accomplishes this.
-

3.

The EEOC Regulations fail to specify whether courts should
assume that all other similarly-situated employers
will apply the same exclusionary criteria

The first prong of the E. E. Black test, and the second and third
prongs of the EEOC test, is to determine the number and types of
jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified.' In making
this determination, the E. E. Black court stated that "... it must be
assumed that all employers offering the same or similar jobs would
use the same requirement or screening process."' The purpose of
this qualification, the court explained, is to prevent employers from
imposing an aberrational but discriminatory job qualification, and then
arguing that because the qualification is unique, it is not a substantial
handicap to employment, and therefore the applicant is not protected
as disabled.'
The EEOC's initial proposed regulations stated that, when determining whether an individual is regarded as substantially limited in
the life activity of working, "it should be assumed that all similar
employers would apply the same exclusionary standard that the employer charged with discrimination has used."' This language was,
however, deleted from the final regulations.' It thus appears that
the Regulations protect employers who impose aberrational job qualifications that discriminate on the basis of real or perceived impair-ments.
The injustice of this approach is well-illustrated by the Tenth

226.
227.

E. E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1100; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(ii)(B) and (C) (1992).
E. E. Black, 497 F. Supp. at 1100.

228. Id.
229. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities; Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (1991).
230. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,728 (1991); see also Tucker, supra note 76, at 4-5 (1992).
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Circuit case of Welsh v. City of Tulsa." Welsh wanted to be a
firefighter. He successfully completed all the job requirements, including a specialized college degree. 2 Nonetheless, his application
was denied because he had decreased sensation in the ring and little
fingers of his right hand. 3 A statewide regulation stated that candidates for the fire department should be rejected for "disturbances of
sensation... which are of such a nature or degree as to preclude the
satisfactory performance of fire duties."' The employer's physician,
believing Welsh's impairment would pose a safety risk to Welsh if an
ember dropped into his glove, recommended the denial of Welsh's
employment application, and the employer rejected Welsh. 5 Following his rejection, Welsh obtained the opinions of two other physicians
that the impairment would not interfere with his employment as a
firefighter: a glove with a high-closed gauntlet, fire resistant glove
liner, and fire resistant tape would eliminate any possibility of hot
embers entering the glove and working their way down into the area
of decreased sensitivity.' The employer conceded that its physician
had erroneously applied the state criteria to Welsh, but nonetheless
maintained that Welsh had not been the victim of discrimination on
the basis of disability. 7
On a motion for summary judgment, both the district court and
the Tenth Circuit agreed. Because Welsh's impairment had only
caused him to be rejected for a single job, the courts held that Welsh
was not "substantially limited" in his ability to work." Further, the
Tenth Circuit held that since the employer's physician had misapplied
a state hiring criterion, Welsh could not assume that other fire departments would also misapply the hiring criterion so as to disqualify
him." Thus, despite the employer's admission that it had rejected
Welsh because it had erroneously regarded Welsh as impaired, the
court held that Welsh could not prove that the employer had regarded
231. 977 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1992).
232. a at 1416. Welsh's B.A. was in safety.
233. Id.
234. Ia (citing Okla. Firefighters Pension & Retirement Sys. Rule 2-2.13.2(c)).
235. Id. This behavior, excluding an employee or applicant for that employee or
applicant's "own good," is precisely the type of paternalistic behavior that Congress intended
to proscribe when it limited the employer's "safety defense" to situations in which reasonable
accommodation would pose a direct threat to the safety of "other individuals" in the

workplace. See supra note 76.
236. Welsh, 977 F.2d at 1416.
237. Ia
238.
239.

Id. at 1417-19.
Id at 1419.
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him as substantially limited in the ability to work.2 The effect of
Welsh is thus to nullify entirely the "regarded as" prong of the anti-

discrimination statute.
4. Both approaches reward employers for saying
one thing and doing another
The Welsh case also illustrates another shortcoming of the Reha-

bilitation Act and EEOC approaches: they encourage employers to say
one thing and to do another. Welsh's employer treated him as if his

"impairment" "substantially limited" his employability, but simultaneously argued that the "impairment" did not "substantially limit" his
employability."1 Conversely, the employee is put in a catch-22 situation. First, she must prove that she either had, or was regarded as
having, an impairment that made it extremely difficult to find mean-

ingful employment opportunities.2 If she succeeds at this, she must
turn around and prove that the impairment (or perceived impairment)

does not actually limit her ability to do the job for which she is
applying.243 By dispensing with the requirement that a plaintiff prove

the unavailability of other employment opportunities, the "once is
enough" standard eliminates this problem.
5.

Both approaches impose an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs

Both the Rehabilitation Act cases2'
and the EEOC
Regulations 2 require the person claiming discrimination to shoulder

the burden of establishing (presumably by expert testimony) that there
are no (or very few) jobs available which mirror her experience and
qualifications. Although the interpretive guidelines to the EEOC Regu-

240. Id.
241. Haines, supra note 125, at 548 (discussing E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F.
Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980)); Burgdorf, supra note 33, at 448.
242. Burgdorf, supra note 33, at 448.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1992) (granting
employer's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff had failed to prove that his impairment precluded him from obtaining other jobs); Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 722 F.
Supp. 633 (D. Or. 1989), aff'd and opinion adopted, 915 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990) (same);
James v. Runyon, No. CIV.A.92-2262, 1992 WL 382311, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9,
1992) (requiring the plaintiff to show each of the three E. E. Black factors as part of her
prima facie case).
245. The EEOC's declaration that "inability to perform a single, particular job does not
constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working," 29 C.F.R. §
1630.20(3)(i) (1992), forces the plaintiff to prove otherwise. See Burgdorf, supra note 33, at
449 n.186.
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lations state that an "onerous evidentiary showing" is not required,'
the plaintiff nonetheless must present "evidence of general employment demographics and/or of recognized occupational classifications
that indicate the appropriate number of jobs" from which the plaintiff
is excluded.) 7 This hardly sounds non-onerous; Rehabilitation Act
cases indicate that courts will likely hold plaintiffs to high standards.'
As Bonnie Tucker notes, this burden is purely a creation of the
EEOC; it is not supported in either the ADA or its legislative history. Enforcement of the ADA would be better served if the existence or nonexistence of alternative jobs was declared to be moot the plaintiff's prima facie evidence of adverse employment action
being dispositive. Alternatively, the burden should be shifted to the
employer to prove that numerous other employment opportunities exist. This makes far more sense than requiring the plaintiff to prove a
negative. It is also much fairer: the employer's burden would only
arise after the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of an adverse
employment action due to a real or perceived impairment.
6.

Both approaches reward the first-in-time discriminator

The focus of both the Rehabilitation Act cases and the EEOC
Regulations on the existence or nonexistence of alternative jobs creates another bizarre anomaly - the first employer to discriminate
against an individual will likely go unpunished, while subsequent
discriminators are likely to be sanctioned. Andrew Haines explains:
If the analyzer rejects the qualitative analysis in certain "first-time
rejection" fact situations - the facts of E. E. Black, Ltd., for example - the statute would create an "anomalous gift" for the employer: one free act of handicap discrimination that the statute does not
treat as a cognizable act, even though the employer's behavior
plainly falls within the spirit of the statute. The net effect is obvious: the first employer can unfairly treat the applicant based on the
latter's health condition without fear of statutory retribution, while
the statute penalizes each successive employer who mistreats this
applicant owing to the fact that these subsequent acts come within

246. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1992).
247. L
248. See supra note 244.
249. Tucker, supra note 76, at 4 n.11.
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the quantitative interpretation of "substantially limits."'
One cannot imagine that Congress intended this outcome. A "once is
enough" approach - by making irrelevant the existence or nonexistence of alternative jobs - would eliminate this anomaly.
7.

Both approaches reward big-city discriminators
while punishing small-town discriminators

The focus of both approaches on the existence or nonexistence of
alternative jobs also means that enforcement of the ADA will depend
on whether the plaintiff lives in a small town or a big city. Bonnie
Tucker explains:
If he lives in a major city, for example, he may not be covered by
Title I [of the ADA], because there are a variety of other jobs
[available]. If, however, he lives in a small town, he may be covered by the ADA because of the smaller number of other jobs
available in that area. Under the Title I regulations, where two
people have identical physical characteristics but live in different
locations, one may be held "disabled" and thus covered under the
ADA, and the other may not. Aside from leading to incongruous results, this provision allows employers in metropolitan areas to engage in conduct that may be held discriminatory when engaged in
by employers in less populated areas. "
Again, Congress could not possibly have intended this. A "once is
enough" standard - by ignoring the existence or nonexistence of
other jobs - would eliminate this bizarre result.
8.

Both approaches ignore the fact that the loss of one
job can constitute a substantial limitation
on an individual's ability to work

The E. E. Black court stated that "men of common intelligence
would not be shocked to find out that a person is substantially impaired in finding employment if he is disqualified from pursuing the
profession of his choice."" 2 Similarly, it should come as no surprise
that a person is substantially impaired in finding employment if she is
rejected for even one job. The Rehabilitation Act cases and EEOC
Regulations to the contrary defy both logic and the plain text of the
250. Haines, supra note 125, at 547.
251. Tucker, supra note 76, at 6.
252. E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1102 (D. Haw. 1980).
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ADA. Take, for example, the case of the telephone installer discussed
in the introduction to this article, who was fired from his job installing telephones because his asthma and medically-induced heat sensitivity made it impossible for him to accept temporary transfers to
extremely hot parts of the country.' 3 He lost his job, and with it his
seniority and other benefits of long-term employment. Consider also
the case of the plaintiff in Reeder, who's application for a promotion was denied because he had a minor speech impediment. Consider, too, Mr. Crosby in E. E. Black.' If the court had upheld the
employer's refusal to hire, Crosby would have "lost" the 3600 hours
he had invested toward becoming a master carpenter. Similarly, consider the would-be firefighter in Welsh,' who's lifelong dream of
becoming a firefighter in his home town was shattered when the
town, on the basis of an erroneous determination of disability, refused
to hire him. These cases provide vivid illustrations of why the loss of
even a single job can constitute a substantial limitation on an
individual's ability to work. A person should be recognized as substantially limited in the major life activity of working if that person is
excluded from even one job because she is - or is regarded as disabled.
This article argues that the EEOC definition of "substantially
limits" is too narrow and excludes a large class of persons Congress
intended to protect. Congress' intent in passing the ADA is discussed
in the next section of this article.
D. The ADA and Congressional Intent
Congress enacted the ADA to protect disabled Americans. 7
Congress deliberately defined "disability" broadly,"8 but simultaneously realized that the scope of the definition must be narrowed to
exclude mere difference. 9 Otherwise, everyone who deviated from

253. See Miller v. AT & T Network Sys., 722 F. Supp. 633 (D. Or. 1989), aff'd and
opinion adopted, 915 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1990) (construing an Oregon statute which is identical, in relevant part, to the ADA).

254. Reeder v. Frank, 813 F. Supp. 773 (D. Utah 1992), aff'd, 986 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 61 (1993) (discussed supra Part 1I-B).
255. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (discussed supra Part IV-A-I).
256. Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussed supra Part V-C3).
257.

42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (Supp. In 1992).

258. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 51-54 (1990).
259. Id. at 51-52.
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the norm in any way (such as hair color, intelligence, personality,
bruised knee) would have a cause of action, and the statute would be
unworkable. For this reason, Congress limited the scope of persons to
be protected under the Act in two ways. First, as discussed in Part II,
Congress imposed an impairment requirement.' Although "impairment," like "disability," is defined broadly, it nonetheless excludes
mere physical characteristics and environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantages."
Not all impairments are disabling. Congress thus imposed a second limitation on the scope of persons to be protected by the ADA:
in order to meet the definition of "disability," an impairment must
result in a "substantial limitation of one or more major life activities." 2 Congress inserted the "major life activity" requirement to
underscore its intent to limit protection of the ADA to persons who
have, or who are regarded as having, major impediments. The
House Report of the Committee on Education and Labor, for example, states:
A person with a minor, trivial impairment, such as an infected
finger, is not impaired in a major life activity. A person is considered an individual with a disability for purposes of the first prong
of the definition when the individual's important life activities are
restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration under which they
can be performed in comparison to most people.'
Importantly, the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate an actual,
major impairment is limited to the first prong of Congress' tripartite
definition of disability. A plaintiff meets the second prong of the
definition if she can show that she was misclassified as having a
disability, even if she does not in fact have the disability.' Likewise, and as discussed in Part m of this article, a plaintiff meets the
third prong of the definition if she can show that her employer regards her as disabled, regardless of whether she actually is disabled
or whether other employers would consider her disabled.' Legislative history further demonstrates that Congress intended the "regarded
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 51-52.
H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 52.
H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 52; Burgdorf, supra note 33, at 447.
H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 52; see also S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.

23 (1990).
265. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, at 53.
266. H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 3, at 30.
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as" prong to be construed extremely broadly.' The House Judiciary
Report, for example, states that a person will be covered under the
"regarded as" test "whether or not the employer's perception was
shared by others in the field."'

A plaintiff, then, who proves that her employer fired her because
she has an infected finger is entitled to the Act's protection. As Congress made clear, this is true regardless of whether other employers
consider her disabled, and regardless of whether her minor impair-

ment forecloses other job opportunities.'

To paraphrase Professor

Bonnie Tucker: the employer has either misclassified the employee as
having a disability, or regards the employee as having a disability

although she is not, in fact, disabled.Y0 In the former case, the
plaintiff meets the second prong of the ADA definition of disability;
in the latter, the third. Either way, she is protected, and her
employer's discrimination proscribed. A person's employment opportunities should thus be recognized as "substantially limited" when that
person is excluded from even one job because she is ed as - disabledY1

267.

or is regard-

Id. at 30-31 ("This list of frequent workplace concerns is not completely exhaus-

five").
268. Id. at 30.
269. Id.
270. Tucker, supra note 76, at 4-5.
271. See Haines, supra note 125, at 547 (arguing that "the integrity of the statutory deftnition of "handicapped individual" requires the adoption of this qualitative [and not merely a
quantitative] interpretation of the phrase "substantially limits"); Burgdorf, supra note 33, at
449 ('The ADA should ameliorate such problems with the concept of "major life activities"
because of evidence that Congress intended that the denial of opportunities to an individual
because of a physical or mental impairment shall in itself qualify as a substantial limitation
on a major life activity.'). Burgdorf argues that the ADA "represents a Congressional rejection of court decisions [such as E. E. Black] that hold that exclusion from a particular job
was not sufficient to establish a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working."
IM at 449 n.186. Burgdorf thus criticizes the EEOC approach, stating that:
Where a worker has been discharged from or refused employment expressly because of a physical or mental impairment, it is inequitable to require that person to
shoulder the burden of establishing (presumably by expert testimony) that he or she
would be unable to perform other jobs. A fairer approach would accept showing
that an employer has based a negative employment decision upon an individual's
physical or mental impairment as establishing a prima facie case that the individual
has been "regarded as having" a disability, and would estop an employer who has
taken a disability-based job action from contesting the substantiality of the underlying actual or perceived impairment.
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V.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

A. The "Once Is Enough" Standard
The EEOC requirement that a plaintiff prove she is disqualified
from a broad range of jobs should be jettisoned in favor of the "once
is enough" approach. Ideally, the burdens should be allocated as
follows:
1. The plaintiff has the prima facie burden to show that the employer took adverse employment action against the plaintiff because
of the plaintiff's actual or perceived impairment.
2. The burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove one of the
statutorily-created affirmative defenses (e.g. direct threat to health or
safety, or undue hardship).
This "once is enough" approach would eliminate all the shortcomings,
discussed in Part In-C, inherent within the Rehabilitation Act and the
EEOC approaches. It would protect employees who have been discriminated against even once on the basis of disability. Finally, it
would further, rather than frustrate, the congressional purpose of protecting employees who are regarded as disabled. It would not, contrary to the assertions of several courts, render the "substantially

limited" phrase meaningless.'m
B.

The Burden-Shifting Standard

An alternative approach is as follows:
1. The plaintiff has the prima facie burden to show that the employer took adverse employment action against the plaintiff because
of the plaintiff's actual or perceived impairment.
2. The burden of proof shifts to the employer to prove either:
a. one of the statutorily-created affirmative defenses; or
b. that
1. within the geographical area to which the plaintiff has
272. See supra Part W-A-1.
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reasonable access,...
2. the same or substantially similar job with the same or substantially similar terms and conditions of employment is available from at least five other employers . . .

3. who do not apply the same exclusionary criteria as does the
employer-defendant.
This approach would first require the plaintiff to make the "once is
enough" showing. After this, the burden would shift to the employer
to prove that numerous other employment opportunities exist. This is
much fairer, because the employer's burden would only arise after the
plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of an adverse employment
action due to a real or perceived impairment.
This burden-shifting approach would significantly ease the
plaintiff's now onerous burden of proving that no jobs exist for
which she is qualified. It would not, however, eliminate entirely the
limitations of the current approach discussed in Part III-C. Nonetheless, to the extent that it reduces employers' abilities to use the existence of other jobs to defeat plaintiffs' claims of discrimination, this
approach reduces the incidence of these limitations. It also preserves
-

albeit in a limited way -

the current meaning of the "substan-

tially limited" phrase.
CONCLUSION

Nothing could be plainer than the fact that a person who is denied a job or who is fired because of a real or perceived disability
has been "substantially limited" in employment. The EEOC Regulations to the ADA, however, require such a person to prove that her
disability disqualifies her from all or nearly all the jobs in her geographical area for which she is qualified. This approach defies logic,
congressional intent, and the plain meaning of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Courts should jettison the EEOC Regulations in favor
of a "once is enough" approach, which recognizes that a person's
employment opportunities are "substantially limited" when she is
excluded from even one job because she is - or is regarded as disabled. At a minimum, courts should apply a burden-shifting approach, which shifts to employers the burden of proving the existence
of alternative employment opportunities.
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